

Authority for
Consumers & Markets



Competition as means for private sector development

The case of the Netherlands

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
Impact assessment

- Calculations of impact of economic policy is a long standing tradition in the Netherlands
- We try to calculate all kinds of impact
- So also in the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets
- Impact analysis was the subject of congress a year ago to celebrate 10 years of Office of CE
- I will concentrate on the impact on productivity and competition questions


Impact cartels on productivity growth

- Limited number of studies
- Levenstein en Suslow (2006): *“perhaps the least studied, but most important issues are the effect cartels have on investment and productivity”*
- Most studies show positive impact of competition on growth
- Still e.g. Baumol thinks that cooperation especially in high tech industries may reduce risk and are not always bad for competition
- The relation competition and productivity runs via innovation.
- Inverted U shaped relationship between competition and innovation


Cartels active 1980-1998



Cartels entry 1980-1998



Cartels exit 1980-1998



Specification estimated

- TFP growth 1982-1998
- Calculations for total economy and for manufacturing and non-manufacturing
- $\Delta \ln TFP_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 (\text{technology gap}_{it-1}) + \beta_2 (\Delta \ln TFP \text{Leader}_{it}) + \beta_3 (\text{human capital}_{it}) + \beta_4 (\text{cartel entry}_{it}) + \beta_5 (\text{cartel exit}_{it}) + \beta_5 (\text{cartel presence}_{it}) + \text{industry fixed effects}_i + \text{time dummies}_t$

Results (1) total (2) manufacturing and non manufacturing (3) extra presence dummies



$\Delta \ln TFP$	(1)	(2)	(3)
Technology gap	.04***		
Technology gap manufacturing		.05***	.05***
Technology gap non- manufacturing		.02**	.02**
$\Delta \ln TFP Leader$.06		
$\Delta \ln TFP Leader$ manufacturing		.01	+ .00
$\Delta \ln TFP Leader$ non- manufacturing		.20	.20
Human capital	+ .00	+ .00	+ .00
Dum cartel entry (1= entry; 0 \neq entry)	- .00	- .01	- .01
Dum cartel exit (1= exit; 0 \neq exit)	+ .00	+ .00	+ .00
Dum cartel presence (1= presence; 0 \neq presence)	- .02**	- .02***	
Dum cartel presence (1= presence; 0 \neq presence) manufacturing			- .03**
Dum cartel presence (1= presence; 0 \neq presence) non-manufacturing			- .02**
R ² within	0.0987	0.1122	0.1129
# observations	459	459	459
# groups	27	27	27
F	14.84	74.79	70.79
Prob > F	0,000	0,000	0,000

Research by Petit, Kemp and Van Sinderen

- Entry of cartel negative impact on TFP-growth but not significant
- Exit of cartel positive impact, but very small
- Cartel presence has negative impact and is significant
- Impact between -0.02 and -0.03
- So a cartel had between 2 and 3 percent negative impact on TFP growth in this period

Labour productivity: impact of competition authorities

- Strong evidence for a positive impact of competition on total factor productivity (Van der Wiel, 2010)
- Effect of different variables on the labour productivity is estimated by Donselaar (2011)
- Addition: indicator for competition policy based on the Global Competition Review (GCR)
- The coefficients represent percentage changes

Labour productivity estimation 1970-2010	Original result	Estimated equation
C(1) Constant	0.03***	-0.075*
C(2) Average length of education	0.40***	0.376***
C(3) Labour market participation	-0.43***	-0.523***
C(4) No. of worked hours per employed person	-0.53***	-0.710***
C(5) Domestic public and private R&D capital	0.11***	0.123***
C(6) Weight of the private R&D capital	0.60***	0.656***
C(7) Interaction domestic R&D capital with domestic in worldly R&D capital	0.65***	0.784***
C(10) Foreign public and private R&D capital	0.15***	0.091**
C(18) Catching-up variable	-0.04***	-0.048***
C(20) Share of (medium)high-tech sectors	0.16***	0.164***
C(21) Norway-specific variable	0.93***	0.846***
C(23) Openness of the economy	0.07***	0.019
C(25) Net capital income quota	0.16**	0.088*
C(27) State of the economy	0.69***	1.057***
C(28) Weight of the current year within the state of the economy	0.51***	0.305**
C(29) Dummy for West-Germany	0.03**	0.056***
C(55) GCR	-	0.022**
C(56) Pre-GCR period	-	0.078**
R ²	0.9872	0.9870
Period	1970-2006	1970-2010
Country dummy's included	Yes	Yes
No. of countries	20	20
No. of observations	740	820
Standard errors	HAC (Newey-West)	HAC (Newey-West)

Labour productivity


- Pre-GCR period: average effect (all countries have equal weight) is equal to 0.078 (dummy)
- This is roughly equal to the effect of the average GCR score ($3.5 * 0.022 = 0.077$)
- Compared to the pre-GCR period, countries with scores below 3.5 do worse, countries above 3.5 do better on productivity

GCR score	Effect
Pre-GCR period	0.078
1	$0.022 * 1 - 0.078 = -0.056$
2	$0.022 * 2 - 0.078 = -0.034$
3	$0.022 * 3 - 0.078 = -0.012$
4	$0.022 * 4 - 0.078 = 0.010$
5	$0.022 * 5 - 0.078 = 0.032$

Labour productivity


- An average score (3.5 in the dataset) gives a more or less neutral effect on labour productivity
- A *below* average score has a *negative* impact on labour productivity, whereas an *above* average score has a *positive* impact on labour productivity
- Conclusion: the good performance of competition authorities has a significant impact on labour productivity

Basic theory



Method outcome calculations competition policy


- Merger control
 - Blocked mergers
 - Mergers with Remedies
 - Stopped by parties after competition problems were noticed
- Cartels
- Misuse of Economic power
- Deals with parties
- Effects on prices
 - Merger 3% ; market; 3 years
 - Cartels 10% ; turnover involved; 3 years
 - Misuse dominant position 5%; turnover involved; 3 years
- Not included
 - Allocation effects
 - Anticipation effects
 - Dynamic effects
 - Type I and II errors



How large is the welfare loss?

- Harberger (1954) – 0,1% GDP
- Scherer & Ross (1990) – 1,3% GDP
- Simple static analysis is incomplete because of distortions by:
 - taxation
 - Imports
 - Dynamic effects
 - Impact on R&D and productivity
- Therefore, we are working on macro calculations

Impuls for simulations



MESEMET-2 model

- Model of Donselaar & Van Sinderen (1998; 2000)
- 125 equations + 44 exogenous variables
- Calculations are in % changes of deviations from a baseline
- Coefficients calculations are based on theory, estimates and calibration
- Update of Van Sinderen & Kemp (2008)

Working of the model

- Redistribution between producer surplus and consumer surplus
- Impact of profits on R&D
- So we also include impact on R&D

Results of redistribution of €2 billion from firms' profits to consumers (0.7 GDP)

		1	10	LT
Production	Y_p	0.6	0.5	0.3
Export	B	0.8	0.4	0.1
Import	M	0.0	0.5	0.4
Consumption	C_p	0.1	0.9	0.9
Investments	I_p	-0.5	-0.3	-0.4
Firms' R&D	RD_p	-1.0	0.6	0.4
Financial balance government	dF	-0.1	0.1	0.1
Employment	L_t	-0.5	0.1	0.1
Price	P	-0.4	-0.1	0.1
Real gross wages	W_t	0.8	0.4	0.3
Profit before taxes	W_{vb}	-5.4	-3.8	-2.8

Conclusions so far

- Increases in production, consumption, R&D, wages, export, import and productivity
- Small increase in employment (compromised by higher labor costs and thus lower demand for labor)
- Decrease in profits and increase in R&D but drop investments. Efficiency of investments increase.

Conclusion

- Impact on productivity is positive
- Mostly some impact of cartels and of authorities in empirical research
- Impact on economic and employment growth positive
- Further model analysis needed
- Impact assessment more and more important